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DRAFT 6/24/09
CORPORATE AND INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM:
LONG, MEDIUM, AND SHORT TERM PROPOSALS
Reuven S. AviYonah1
The current controversy surrounding President Obama’s international tax proposals
seems like an opportune moment to try to consider them in context. How do these
proposals fit in with an agenda for US corporate and international tax reform?
Few observers doubt that such reforms are sorely needed, for several reasons. First,
the long‐term budgetary outlook is unsustainable. Second, the US corporate tax rate
is among the highest in the OECD. Third, the current system raises relatively little
revenue and large amounts of corporate income go untaxed. Finally, the system is
horrendously convoluted and imposes high transaction costs.
This paper will attempt to raise some proposals for US corporate and international
tax reform. It will begin by asking why we need to tax corporations at all, since the
rationale for the corporate tax is important for assessing reform proposals. It will
then discuss options for corporate and international tax reform, beginning with
long‐term options (a 10 year horizon), continuing with the medium term (2‐5 years)
and concluding with short‐term options like the Obama proposals (1‐2 years).
1. Why Tax Corporations?
The problem with justifying the corporate tax is that the incidence of the tax is
murky. For economists, the one thing that is clear is that corporations, as legal
entities, do not bear the burden of the corporate tax. Taxes must be born by people,
not legal fictions, but after fifty years of research into this issue economists are still
undecided about who bears the burden: the corporation’s shareholders, all capital
providers, labor or consumers.
I do not have a view on this economic issue, nor am I sure it will ever be definitively
resolved (it seems likely that the incidence will constantly shift depending on
market conditions, which determine the ease of imposing the burden on someone
other than the shareholders). However, I have argued elsewhere that in a
meaningful way the corporate tax can be seen as a tax on the corporation itself, i.e.,
on the people who manage the affairs of the legal entity at any given moment. The
original rationale for the corporate tax was to regulate and limit the power of
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corporate managers that results from controlling large concentrations of capital,
and I believe this rationale is still the best justification for taxing corporations.2
If the corporate tax is seen as falling on the corporation itself, several conclusions
follow. First, the payment of the corporate tax can be seen as an aspect of corporate
social responsibility. To the extent that the state and not corporations bears the
burden of addressing problems created in part by corporate actions, like
environmental issues or unemployment, the corporation is responsible for paying
taxes to give the state the resources it needs to meet this burden.3 In that sense
corporate management have the same responsibility to pay their fair share of taxes
that individual citizens do.
Second, if the corporate tax is seen as a payment for the costs imposed by corporate
activity on society, then it is not based on the ability to pay theory that underlies the
modern individual income tax. Instead, the corporate tax is based on the older
exchange theory: it is a payment for the costs imposed on the state by corporate
activity and for the benefits received by the corporation in the form of defense,
infrastructure, education, and other forms of government activity.
Third, it follows from the second point that from an international perspective, when
there is more than one taxing jurisdiction, the corporate tax should be primarily
source‐based. This is congruent with the international tax regime that assigns the
primary right to tax active business income to the source jurisdiction. It also reflects
the fact that corporate residence is not very meaningful and that corporations do
not vote. Moreover, given the uncertainty about the incidence of the corporate tax, it
should not be seen as a vehicle for progressive taxation or redistribution. Residence‐
based corporate taxation is only justified as a backstop to source‐based taxation.
2. LongTerm Proposals
In the long term (ten years and more), tax reform in the United States is dominated
by the dire budgetary prospects. Because of the impending retirement and health
care costs of the baby boom generation, we face the prospect of deficits exceeding
$1 trillion per year for an indefinite period. By 2019, under current projections, the
debt to GDP ratio will exceed 80%. This picture is unsustainable because neither US
nor foreign savers would be willing to lend the US government the necessary funds.4
Since drastic cuts to Social Security and Medicare are both unjustified and politically
unacceptable, this means that taxes will have to be raised at some point in the next
decade to pay for at least part of the deficit (the rest can perhaps be covered by
restraining the growth in health care costs). Raising the existing individual and
corporate income tax rates, or the existing payroll tax, seems both politically very
Avi‐Yonah (2004).
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unlikely and unwise, given that our main competitors have been steadily reducing
those tax rates.
Thus, in my opinion the only feasible solution in the long term is to follow the rest of
the OECD and enact a value added tax. A VAT enacted in addition to the existing
individual and corporate income taxes can be a normal credit‐invoice, destination
based tax, like the VATs in use in over 130 other countries. It is a proven revenue
raiser even at relatively low rates, as shown by the Japanese and Canadian
experience (both of whom have a rate of less than 10%).
However, as many scholars have suggested, it would also be possible to enact a VAT
at a higher rate and use the revenue to replace part of the individual and corporate
income tax. Michael Graetz, for example, has suggested using the VAT revenues to
exempt income up to $100,000 from individual income tax (for simplification
purposes) and for replacing the corporate tax (for competitiveness reasons).5
I am doubtful that we can go as far as Graetz recommends. We need the added
revenues, and the Graetz proposals are designed to be revenue neutral. Nor do I
think it is advisable to raise the VAT rate too high. Experience in Europe has shown
that high VAT rates, like high income tax rates, lead to more evasion and avoidance
and higher transaction costs.
In addition, I think abolishing the corporate tax would be a mistake (and unlikely to
fly politically). Enacting a VAT in lieu of the corporate tax would tempt politicians to
see the VAT as a form of corporate tax and load it with entity‐based exemptions
designed to regulate corporate behavior and encourage desired activities. These
functions are best left to the existing corporate tax. The VAT should be as clean as
possible, with a low flat rate and a broad base.6
However, I do think the corporate tax can be significantly simplified if we enact a
VAT. Specifically, I would support in that case permitting corporations to expense all
capital expenditures. From an economics perspective this turns the corporate tax
into a cash flow or consumption tax. This change leads to significant simplification
because corporations will not have to account for basis and will dispense with
taxable and tax‐free realization events, but it should not be a major revenue loser
because the resulting tax only exempts the risk‐free rate of return on capital, while
economic rents remain taxable. Most corporate income consists of economic rents,
and those are the kinds of income that justify the corporate tax because the state
makes them possible (risk‐free returns can be earned in many locations but rents
are more unique). The revenue loss can be made up with the VAT. Nor is this
change unprecedented, because the UK made it when it introduced the VAT in the
1970s.
5
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3. MediumTerm Proposals
In the medium term, it would be desirable to move the corporate tax more in the
direction of a pure source‐based tax, for the reasons explained above. However, we
cannot do that without first tackling the knotty problems of defining the source of
income and transfer pricing. Moving to territoriality without reforming transfer
pricing is a recipe for increased shifting of profits outside the US taxing jurisdiction.
My colleagues Michael Durst and Kimberly Clausing and I have developed a detailed
proposal to reform transfer pricing and the source rules by adopting formulary
apportionment.7 Our proposed formula is based on the current profit split
regulations and assigns normal returns to where the costs of producing income are
incurred, while residuals are assigned based on the destination of sales. This
formula favors the US as an importing country, and one can imagine different
formulas negotiated with the EU if it goes ahead and adopts formulary
apportionment for internal EU purposes, as the European Commission has
proposed.
We believe that we have adequately addressed the various objections raised to our
proposal, and that the benefits far exceed the costs. One particular objection, that
formulary apportionment violates our treaty obligations, has been weakened by the
recent Ninth Circuit decision in Xilinx (in which the court held that the saving clause
in US treaties exempts all US resident corporations from the arm’s length standard,
and this would apply to subsidiaries of foreign multinationals as well).
The biggest advantage of adopting our proposal is that it will enable the US to move
in the direction of territoriality. Not only will dividends, interest and royalties
within a US‐based multinational be exempt from tax, but in principle we could go
further and abolish both Subpart F and the foreign tax credit. Conceptually,
formulary apportionment means that the US will tax each multinational (whether
US or foreign based) only on the income that the formula assigns to the US, and on
no other income. We do not believe this will result in more double taxation than the
current arm’s length system even if other countries do not follow the US lead, but
we also think that other countries will in fact follow our lead because otherwise
multinationals will find it too easy to shift income to the US (where booking it will
have no tax consequences under the formula).
One potential downside to eliminating residence‐based corporate taxation in this
way would be that tax competition might be enhanced. We do not have a problem
with tax competition per se; countries should be free to set their general corporate
tax rate as low as they choose, and we have estimated that adopting formulary
apportionment would enable the US to finance a significant cut in the corporate tax
rate.
7
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Tax competition in the form of incentives for multinationals would persist under
pure source‐based taxation based on formulary apportionment, but we do not
regard that form of competition as necessarily harmful, as long as it is based on a
careful analysis of the costs and benefits of the tax incentive. However, formulary
apportionment would take care of the worst form of tax competition, in which
profits are shifted arbitrarily without any real consequences. The data show that
this form of tax competition is rampant (eight of the top 10 locations for US
multinational profits had effective tax rate of 10% or less in 2005, and none of them
had corresponding real investment).
4. Shortterm Proposals
In the short term, I believe the Obama proposals are on the right track, because as
long as transfer pricing reform is not enacted bolstering residence‐based corporate
taxation is necessary as a backstop to source‐based taxation. The Obama proposals
are a cautious first step in this direction and are justified by the data showing
massive under‐taxation of the foreign profits of US‐based multinationals.
However, I also believe that some additional proposals might be helpful. Specifically,
I would argue that some of the added revenue should be used to finance a cut in the
corporate tax rate to bring it more into line with those of our trading partners.
Although the effective US tax rate is not particularly high, studies show that the
marginal tax rate affects investment patterns, so that having the second highest rate
in the OECD is not advisable.
If the Obama proposals for multinational taxation are adopted, the following further
ideas should be implemented in the short run:
1. To protect US residence‐based taxation from inversion transactions, the
“managed and controlled” definition of US corporate residence from the Stop
Tax Haven Abuse Act should be adopted as well.
The Obama proposals increase the pressure on the distinction between US‐
and foreign‐based multinationals, and I believe the current anti‐inversion
rule in IRC 7874 is insufficient. When the UK beefed up its CFC rules in
conjunction with adopting limited territoriality, some UK corporations
nominally moved to Ireland, but HMRC are challenging this purported move
because they have the managed and controlled standard to rely on. The IRS
should have the same ability.
2. The foreign tax credit ideas should be implemented in conjunction with full
cross‐crediting (i.e., no distinction between the active and passive baskets).
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The need for baskets depends on how many US multinationals are in an
excess credit position, because if they are in excess limit there is no incentive
to invest overseas. Since our tax rate is now higher than our trading partners’
this is an unlikely outcome and the added complexity of having even two
baskets is unjustified.
3. If we adopt the refundable withholding tax on non‐QI portfolio investment,
then we can abolish all “regular” outbound withholding on dividends,
interest and royalties, as well as the branch profit tax.
The need to impose withholding taxes arises from the need to protect the
domestic US tax base, but this is adequately dealt with in the Obama
proposals by a combination of information exchange and refundable
withholding. If those are enacted I see no need for regular withholding. We
do not withhold on portfolio interest, royalties and capital gains, and
dividend withholding is easily avoided by using derivatives. The only
meaningful withholding is on direct dividends, and even that is eliminated
by some of our recent treaties. I do not believe we need withholding for
treaty negotiation purposes since we already have treaties with low
withholding rates with all OECD members, and non‐OECD countries are
uninterested in reducing US withholding on portfolio investments. Thus, we
can save a lot of transaction costs at little revenue cost by eliminating regular
withholding and the branch profit tax.
4. On the other hand, we should tighten up the earning stripping rules by
applying the IRC 7874 standards to all foreign corporations, and extend them
to royalties as well.
These provisions are needed as added protection for the US corporate tax
base. In the absence of transfer pricing reform foreign multinationals (and
inverted US multinationals not caught by 7874, like grandfathered ones)
have too much ability to strip income out of the US via interest and royalty
payments, as the current Glaxo litigation shows.
5. Finally, I would abolish FIRPTA and replace it with a tax on capital gains on
large participations (to the extent consistent with our treaty obligations).
It never made sense to tax foreigners on US real estate, which cannot be
exported, and the tax can be avoided by using foreign holding corporations.
FIRPTA also imposes transaction costs whenever there is uncertainty about
whether over 50% of corporate value is in real estate, even for small
portfolio shareholders. On the other hand, when a foreign multinational
acquires a US‐based one, it can export valuable intangibles at will, and that
should be reflected by taxing it on dispositions, as many countries do. The tax
can be enforced because any buyer of large participations wants to register
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shares in its name and obtain voting rights. We should not override treaties,
but should renegotiate our existing ones if they do not allow such a tax (and
many do).
5. Conclusion
Some form of tax reform seems inevitable, at least in the long run. In the short run, if
there is going to be any non‐tax legislation that costs additional money, it seems
quite likely that tax provisions would be attached to it, and that taxing
multinationals and US residents who evade their tax obligations is more politically
acceptable than taxing the middle class.
For these reasons, I think that despite the current torrent of criticism, some form of
the Obama proposals will be enacted in 2009. The preceding has been an attempt to
offer some additional suggestions for short‐, medium‐ and long‐term reform of US
corporate and international taxation. If we want to keep taxing corporations (and I
believe we should, for the reasons set out in the beginning), some form of reform
along these lines would seem necessary to prevent the corporate tax base from
being completely eroded by shifting profits overseas, while keeping the US economy
competitive with our trading partners.
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